Workers Comp Bars Recovery By Injured San Francisco Firefighter

A San Francisco firefighter who was critically injured when a city bus drove over a hoseline at a building fire, has lost his suit to hold the city and the bus driver liable. Matthew Vann suffered a traumatic brain injury and spent two weeks in ICU following the November 2, 2020 fire.

The bus reportedly snagged the hose and ripped it from the apparatus. Vann was struck by the hose, knocking his helmet off, and causing him to fall striking his head. Besides the traumatic brain injury, he suffered a fractured clavicle, injury to his right eye, and damage to his throat and vocal chords. His injuries required surgery and extensive rehab.

Vann filed suit against the bus driver, Louis Yu, and the City and County of San Francisco, as the entity responsible for the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency. The suit was filed in San Francisco County Superior Court alleging negligence.

The trial court concluded that Vann’s suit was barred by workers compensation exclusivity. Workers comp exclusivity is a principle that prohibits employees from suing their employer or co-workers for negligence for work related injuries. It is the result of the great social compromise that gave us workers comp: the employee enjoys the no-fault financial protections of workers comp, while the employer enjoys defacto immunity from lawsuits arising out of work-related injuries. The immunity extends to suits between coworkers.

Vann appealed to the California Court of Appeals, arguing that Yu was not a coworker and that San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency was a separate employer from the San Francisco Fire Department.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, reasoning as follows:

• [The Workers Comp Act] provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, an employer’s liability to pay compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act is “in lieu of any other liability whatsoever” if specified “conditions of compensation concur.
• So, when the statutory conditions for recovery are met, the employer is immune from civil damages liability for on-the-job injuries because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.”
• A parallel exclusive remedy provision … “prohibits actions against coemployees for injuries they cause when [acting within the scope of their employment.]”
• “To prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against co-employees, who in turn would seek indemnity from their employers, the Legislature … provided immunity to co-employees acting within the scope of their employment.
• In other words, the purpose of the exclusivity rule would be defeated if employees could bring actions against fellow employees acting in the scope of employment such that the fellow employees’ negligence could be imputed to their employers.
• Therefore, workers’ compensation was also made the exclusive remedy against fellow employees acting within the scope of employment.”
• [Vann]’s arguments treat the City, SFMTA, and SFFD as three separate legal entities.
• His position presupposes that for purposes of a lawsuit for damages, a municipal department can and does possess a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality by which it was created.
• However, [Vann] does not present any argument … to support this premise.
• SFFD and SFMTA have no legal existence separate from the City.
• The trial court agreed with this, finding that SFMTA and SFFD “remain part of ‘a single
• governmental entity’—the City,” before concluding workers’ compensation is appellant’s sole remedy.
• SFMTA is described throughout the City Charter and other municipal codes as an agency that is a part of the City.
• As to its governance, although [Vann] correctly notes that SFMTA is governed by its own board of directors, those directors must be appointed by the Mayor (the chief executive officer and the official representative of the City) and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors (the legislative branch of the City) after a public hearing.
• Additionally, appellant omits mentioning Article VIIIA of the City Charter, which states: “this Article is intended to ensure sufficient oversight of [SFMTA] by, among other things, preserving the role of the City’s Controller as to financial matters, the City Attorney as to legal matters, and the Civil Service Commission, as to merit system issues.”
• These provisions confirm that SFMTA does not have a governing body separate from that of the City.
• While SFMTA does have exclusive authority power to acquire control, and operate property under its jurisdiction, including real and personal property and financial assets, as well as over contracting, leasing, and purchasing, it cannot transfer or dispose any property of the City without approval from the Board of Supervisors.
• Based on all of the above, we reject appellant’s assertion that SFMTA was “plainly intended” to exist independently of the City.
• We are not persuaded otherwise by appellant’s citations.
• Applying the reasoning of Walker and Colombo here compels the conclusion that because SFFD and SFMTA are merely parts of the same entity, the City, it is the City that effectively employs both appellant and Yu.
• It follows that workers’ compensation provides the exclusive remedy for appellant’s claims against the City as his employer and against Yu as his coemployee.

Here is a copy of the decision: