Court Dismisses Boeing and Fire Contractor from Woolsey Fire Litigation

Los Angeles County Superior Court has ruled that neither the Boeing Company nor its fire protection contractor, Universal Protection Services, L.P., can be held liable for the harm that occurred as a result of the Woolsey Fire in 2018. That fire started on property owned by Boeing and NASA that ultimately burned 96,949 acres, destroyed 1,643 structures, required the evacuation of 295,000 people, and claimed three lives.

The court’s ruling was part of a mass tort litigation involving thousands of plaintiffs. As explained in the decision:

• The Woolsey Fire ignited the afternoon of November 08, 2018. The cause was malfunctioning electrical transmission equipment owned by the Southern California Edison Company.
• The overhead power lines that sparked the fire traversed the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, which is owned by The Boeing Company and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, an agency of the federal government, and managed by Boeing.
• Boeing contracted with Universal Protection Service, L.P. (“Allied”) to provide fire prevention and protection services at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory site.
• Allied, as Boeing’s contractor, responded to the fire. It, along with government firefighters, was unable to contain the blaze to Boeing’s and NASA’s property.

The suits were primarily filed against Southern California Edison. However, some of the complaints also named Boeing and Allied, claiming that their failure to contain the blaze to the Santa Susana Field Laboratory property caused their damages. The legal theories included negligence, trespass, nuisance, and statutory fire liability under California law. Boeing and Allied sought to have the suits against them dismissed.

The court first addressed the claims against Allied. Quoting from the decision:

• All plaintiffs that sued Allied also sued Boeing and Edison, acknowledging that the fire was caused by Edison’s negligence and other misconduct, but also alleging that Boeing and Allied failed to maintain the Santa Susana Field Laboratory property in a safe condition and failed to provide adequate fire prevention and firefighting services that would have prevented the Woolsey Fire from escaping to plaintiffs’ properties.
• 1. Negligence
• The elements of negligence are “a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.”
• The chief dispute is whether Allied owed a duty to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that Allied “had been subcontracted by [Boeing] to fulfill [Boeing’s] duty to prevent and fight fires” originating on its property; [that] Boeing and Allied “failed to maintain [Boeing’s] property in a safe condition and failed to provide adequate fire prevention and firefighting resources for a known and foreseeable wildfire hazard—exactly the hazard for which [Allied] had been contracted to prevent and ameliorate.” [and that the] Woolsey Fire “could have been controlled, extinguished, or at least contained until additional resources could arrive to assist.”
• “[A]s a general rule, an individual or entity does not have a duty under the common law to come to the aid of another person whom the individual or entity has not injured.”
• “The law does not impose [a] duty on a defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the plaintiff would suffer the harm alleged.” This principle applies regardless of the scope of the danger or the ease of the rescue.
• So the starting premise is that Allied would owe no duty to plaintiffs since Allied was not the direct cause of the harm that created a need for assistance.
• A number of exceptions are recognized, such as when the defendant undertook to come to the aid of another, or if a special relationship exists between the defendant and the victim.
• The element in controversy is …whether “the services rendered were of a kind [Allied] should have recognized as necessary for the protection of” plaintiffs’ real property.
• This is a legal question of whether a duty exists.
• Cases cited by the parties indicate that a service is recognized as necessary for the protection of third parties when it directly benefits third persons.
• Here, there is no demonstrated obligation of Boeing to prevent a fire ignited by another on its property from spreading to plaintiffs’ lands.
• Nothing indicates that Boeing did anything on its lands (such as engaging in activity likely to ignite a fire) that made it likely it would have to protect its neighbors from a fire on its lands. And nothing indicates that Allied was hired to protect the property of Boeing’s neighbors.
• Boeing retained Allied to protect Boeing’s and NASA’s land—not plaintiffs’.
• The other means by which plaintiffs could plead an exception to the general rule is by establishing a special relationship between Allied and plaintiffs.
• Evaluating the facts alleged … indicates that plaintiffs have not stated a claim on which Allied should be held liable.
• The transaction could not have been intended to affect plaintiffs.
• The agreement was for the protection of Boeing’s and NASA’s property only. Any benefit to neighboring property holders would be incidental at best.
• Allied was hired by Boeing to respond to fires that ignited on Boeing’s property. It thus had a contractual duty to Boeing and NASA to protect their property from fires. Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to allege that Allied also owed them a duty. There are no allegations of facts that would establish that the firefighting contract between Allied and Boeing was necessary for the safety and protection of plaintiffs and their property, nor do the allegations support a finding of duty.
• 2. Trespass
• “The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.”
• “[W]hen a defendant intentionally starts a fire on its property, and negligently allows that fire to escape onto and to damage the adjoining plaintiffs’ property,” it is a trespass under California law.
• It is not possible for Allied to be liable under a trespass theory because it did not start the fire that damaged plaintiffs’ property.
• 3. Nuisance
• Nuisance claims are similar to trespass claims, but do not require proof of damage to the plaintiff’s property—only proof of interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the property.
• The nuisance plaintiff must also show that the invasion was substantial and unreasonable.
• [T]he critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”
• “Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.”
• Allied owed no duty to plaintiffs as a matter of law to undertake such efforts. For this additional reason the demurrers to the nuisance causes of action are sustained.
• 4. Sections 13007 and 13008 of the Health and Safety Code
• Finally, Allied challenges the causes of action for violation of sections 13007 and 13008 of the Health and Safety Code.
• Section 13007 provides that anyone who negligently sets fire to or allows fire to be set to “the property of another, whether privately or publicly owned, is liable to the owner of such property for any damages to the property caused by the fire.”
• One who attempted to suppress a fire did not “attend” the fire for the purpose of liability under section 13007.
• Section 13008 provides that someone who allows “any fire burning upon his property to escape to the property of another, whether privately or publicly owned, without exercising due diligence to control such fire, is liable to the owner of such property” for fire damages.
• Allied did not own either of the properties in question (which were owned by Boeing and NASA), and plaintiffs’ generalized allegations of alleged “control” by Allied over such property do not convert Allied into a property owner for these purposes.
• The demurrers to these causes of action are sustained.

As for Boeing, the court similarly analyzed each of the four theories resulting in the same outcome on slightly different reasoning. Boeing also made an argument for immunity protection, which the court entertained as a fifth ground.

• 1. Negligence
• Unlike Allied, Boing is the owner of the property upon which the Woolsey Fire ignited. The question is thus whether a landowner has a duty to extinguish or combat a fire burning on its property, even if ignition of the fire occurred through no fault of the landowner.
• Boeing … might be responsible for failing to take action to stop a fire it started on its land from blowing onto a neighbor’s property. But …. Boeing did not ignite the Woolsey Fire.
• Did Boeing owe a duty to these far-flung landowners, or just to its immediate neighbors?
• Accordingly, while common law negligence … and statutory provisions consistent therewith in California imposed a theoretical default duty on Boeing to respond to the incipient Woolsey Fire, this is not the end of analysis.
• Boeing had no Moral Blame for owning the utility easement where the fire started where the utility had the primary responsibility for maintaining the man-made and natural conditions of the easement.
• While not dispositive, this is a very important consideration.
• Preventing Future Harm in the form of lethal, uncontrolled wildfires might speak in favor of imposing legal liability on Boeing in conjunction with Edison.
• But on the issue of Burden, the theory necessarily takes a fatal dive because this kind of legal liability imposed not just on Boeing, a large corporate entity, but on every owner of a fee simple (and possibly on possessors of leaseholds) would create an impossible amount of liability.
• [The Supreme Court of California] expressly recognizes that imposition of limitless liability in the name of tort law is contrary to the sound public policy which informs our common law of torts.
• If this form of liability was seen to be the tort law in California, the current problems in the first-party insurance market in California would merely be a fond memory.
• 2. Trespass
• As was previously discussed, “when a defendant intentionally starts a fire on its property, and negligently allows that fire to escape onto and to damage the adjoining plaintiffs’ property,” it is a trespass under California law.
• Like Allied, it is not possible for Boeing to be liable under a trespass theory because Boeing did not start the fire that damaged plaintiffs’ property.
• 3. Nuisance
• As previously discussed, nuisance claims are similar to trespass claims, but do not require proof of interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the property.
• Edison started the fire; plaintiffs merely allege that Boeing failed to stop it, which is not the same as alleging that Boeing assisted in its creation.
• The Court is unpersuaded that allegations that Boeing failed to clear vegetation around Edison’s malfunctioning transmission equipment suffices as a pleading of creation or assistance in the creation of the nuisance.
• The Court holds that Boeing owed no duty to plaintiffs as a matter of law to undertake such efforts.
• 4. Sections 13007 and 13008 of the Health and Safety Code
• Plaintiffs do not allege that Boeing kindled the Woolsey Fire; they merely allege that Boeing failed to stop it.
• Section 13008 provides that someone who allows “any fire burning upon his property to escape to the property of another, whether privately or publicly owned, without exercising due diligence to control such fire, is liable to the owner of such property” for fire damages. Conceptually this is no different than Plaintiffs invocation of Civil Code § 1714 as a statutory declaration of the general duty standard for negligence claims.
• As noted above … the tort theory under § 13008 must die for the same reason that the basic negligence claim must fail.
• 5. Boeing’s Immunity Arguments
• Given the rulings above, this is moot. One comment is nevertheless worth noting.
• The immunity created by Health & Safety Code § 13863(b) for the benefit of public agencies (which Boeing sought to invoke) extends to failure to establish a fire department or fire protection district; failure to maintain sufficient personnel, equipment, or other fire protection facilities; and the condition of fire protection or firefighting equipment or facilities.
• These grants of immunity are broad.
• It is presumably for this reason that the many plaintiffs injured physically or financially by the Woolsey conflagration have not sued the public entities, such as the Counties of Los Angeles and Ventura, which maintained the public fire-fighting forces which were so overwhelmed by this wildfire, as fully and frankly acknowledged in the After-Action Report discussed previously.
• It would be somewhat anomalous if Allied or Boeing were expected to pay in tort liability to thousands of claimants for their failed attempt to contain the fire in its infancy when the principal actors in the grossly inadequate firefight are legally immune for negligence in their collective efforts.

Here is a copy of the decision for those who may be inclined to read more.