Texas Court Upholds Frisco’s Termination of Assistant Fire Chief on Extended PTSD Leave
The Texas Court of Appeals has upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a former assistant fire chief in Frisco. Cameron Kraemer claimed claimed the city violated its own personnel policies and unlawfully discriminated against him by terminating his employment while he remained out on leave for post-traumatic stress disorder.
Chief Kraemer had served as an assistant chief since 2017 and became Assistant Chief of Emergency Services the following year. In August 2022, he began leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act for PTSD. After his FMLA leave expired in November, he remained out under the city’s leave policy, later submitting a workers’ compensation claim that was denied after the city’s third-party administrator concluded the condition was not job-related.
In early 2023, Kraemer requested unpaid leave through March 31 as an accommodation, telling the city he expected to return April 3. The city approved that request. On March 31, he asked for another month of unpaid leave through April 30, stating that at the end of that period he would “be re-evaluated.” The city’s human resources director, Lauren Safranek, viewed that request as indefinite leave and initially advised that it could not be granted in that form. During a telephone conversation, Chief Kraemer proposed a modified-duty return allowing him to ease back into full-time work. According to Chief Kraemer’s deposition testimony, Safranek told him any return, partial or otherwise, required a third-party psychological evaluation and that anything short of a full return would not work.
Safranek nevertheless extended his leave through April 30 to allow him time to obtain the required clearance. Chef Kraemer did not submit that clearance. Instead, on April 28, he submitted another accommodation request seeking leave through May 31, again stating he would “be re-evaluated” at the end of that period.
On May 1, 2023, the city terminated his employment. The termination letter stated that the vacancy in the assistant fire chief position was compromising fire department operations and that continued leave would create an undue burden for both the department and the city, “placing the safety of the community and the department at risk.”
Chief Kraemer sued, alleging breach of contract and disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. The 416th Judicial District Court of Collin County ruled in favor of the city, prompting Chief Kraemer to appeal to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, rejecting Chief Kraemer’s breach-of-contract claim, holding that the city’s personnel policies expressly stated: “Nothing in the Personnel Policies shall be construed as an employment contract between the City of Frisco and its employees.” The court said that disclaimer defeated any argument that the policies created an enforceable contract.
On the disability claims, the court focused on whether Chief Kraemer was qualified to perform the job at the time of his termination. The record showed that his treating physician had not cleared him to return to work “in any capacity whatsoever” at the fire department, and Chief Kraemer acknowledged in deposition that neither he nor his healthcare providers could say he was able to work there between August 2022 and May 1, 2023.
The court also found no evidence that either of the accommodations he proposed—part-time work or additional unpaid leave—would have enabled him to resume the essential functions of assistant fire chief in the near future. Even nearly a year later, his physician testified he still was not ready to return, and more than two years later Chief Kraemer testified that returning remained only “very plausible in the future.”
As to the claim that the city failed to engage in an interactive process, the court noted that the city had already extended his leave beyond both FMLA and city policy limits, discussed modified duty, and advised him that medical clearance was required for any return. The court concluded the breakdown occurred when Chief Kraemer did not pursue the psychological evaluation or otherwise respond to that requirement.
Finally, his retaliation claim under state law also failed. Chief Kraemer argued that his request for light duty opposed what he characterized was the city’s “100% healed” policy. The court held:
- To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show: (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the TCHRA, (2) he experienced a material adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.
- Although the Supreme Court of Texas has not foreclosed the possibility of an accommodation request serving as an opposition to a discriminatory practice, it has made clear that “to invoke the protections […] the conduct relied on by the employee must, at a minimum, alert the employer to the employee’s reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.
- Here… there is no evidence in the record that Kraemer alerted the City—either in the conversation itself or in any other communications he had with City personnel—that he was making the modified duty request as a means of opposing a discriminatory practice, or that he otherwise put the City on notice that he believed disability discrimination was “at issue.”
- Consequently, we conclude that Kraemer did not present any evidence raising a fact issue on whether he engaged in a protected activity as required to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the TCHRA. Because governmental immunity bars Kraemer’s claim for retaliation against the City, the trial court correctly granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction as to this claim.
Here is a copy of the decision: