Arson Investigator Should Have Given Suspect Miranda Warning Before Firehouse Interview

An Illinois appellate court has ruled that the failure of a fire investigator to provide a suspect with a Miranda warning prior to an interview, violated her Constitutional rights warranting the reversal of her conviction for arson. Adriane L. Parke was convicted of arson for a fire that occurred in the Drury Inn in Mt. Vernon, Illinois on December 2, 2015.

Parke was employed at the hotel as a housekeeper. She claimed she accidentally knocked over a candle while cleaning a room, but believed she extinguished the fire before leaving the room to begin cleaning the next room. When she returned to the room a few minutes later the fire was well involved.

On December 23, 2015, Parke was interviewed by Fire Investigator Shane Emrich of the Mt. Vernon Fire Department. He was assisted in the interview by Detective Nathan Franklin of the Mt. Vernon Police Department. The interview took place at the Mt. Vernon Fire Department. Despite believing that Parke was a suspect and that her version of the events were not truthful, neither Emrich nor Franklin provided Parke with a Miranda warning.

The trial court concluded that a Miranda warning was not required since she was not in custody, and was free to leave. Parke was convicted based in part upon admissions she made during the December 23, 2015 interview. She appealed claiming her answers and anything that flowed from the interview should have been suppressed. The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District agreed, reversed the conviction, and sent the case back for a new trial.

In a lengthy decision that extensively reviewed the facts as well as the law related to Miranda, the court held [citations and quotation marks removed to facilitate reading]:

• In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that, prior to the start of an interrogation, a person being questioned by law enforcement officers must first be warned that she has a right to remain silent, that any statement she does make may be used as evidence against her, and that she has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, as long as that person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom of action in any significant way.
• The finding of custody is essential, as the pre-interrogation warnings required by Miranda are intended to assure that any inculpatory statement made by a defendant is not simply the product of the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.
• The determination of whether a defendant is in custody, and, therefore, whether the warnings set forth in Miranda are required, involves two discrete inquiries, including: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
• When examining the circumstances of interrogation, our supreme court found a number of factors relevant in determining whether a defendant made a statement in a custodial setting, including: (1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of questioning; (2) the number of police officers present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of family and friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure, such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.
• After examining and weighing these various factors, we must then make an objective determination as to whether, under the facts presented, a reasonable person, innocent of any crime would have believed that she could terminate the encounter and was free to leave.
• After considering the relevant factors and the circumstances of this case, we find that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation, requiring Miranda, when defendant confessed to starting the fire at the Drury Inn on December 2, 2015.
• As to the mood and mode of questioning, the recorded video reveals that Emrich initially handed defendant a bottle of water and informed her that he planned to conduct an information gathering interview.
• As the recorded video progressed, however, both Emrich and Franklin pronounced their suspicions to defendant with respect to defendant’s culpability.
• The video reveals that defendant became more tense and changed her body language.
• The video shows that Emrich stated at least 10 times that he did not believe defendant’s version of events and accused her of lying and withholding the truth.
• Similarly, Franklin interjected halfway through the interview, informing defendant that he was trained to listen to people talk. Franklin then proceeded to state to defendant at least two times that she was not telling the truth.
• Franklin also claimed that he and Emrich knew that defendant intentionally started the fire in room 603.
• The trial court determined that Emrich and Franklin did not coerce defendant in any way.
• Rather, Emrich and Franklin were low-key compared to most police interviews the court had watched over the years and took a kind tone.
• Although we agree… that neither Emrich nor Franklin were unkind or threatened defendant, defendant found herself in a room in the presence of two larger men, including Franklin, a police officer, who defendant never agreed to meet with and failed to introduce himself to defendant at the outset of the interrogation.
• Importantly, the court failed to make a factual finding that the officers verbally conveyed their belief to defendant that she was guilty and how this knowledge by defendant would affect a reasonable person in defendant’s position with respect to her perception that she was free to leave.
• The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that if an officer’s beliefs of a person’s guilt are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned, such beliefs may bear upon the custody issue. The Court further stated that such disclosed beliefs are relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action.
• In our view, the mood and mode of questioning employed by Emrich and Franklin weighs in favor of a finding of a custodial interrogation.
• We also note that there were no indicia of formal arrest procedures during defendant’s questioning at the fire department. The record is devoid of any use of a show of force, physical restraint, booking, or fingerprinting. Despite this, throughout defendant’s time at the fire department, Emrich wore a uniform, and Franklin carried a holstered weapon.
• Moreover, approximately 25 minutes into the interview, Franklin interjected and stated that he heard major inconsistencies with defendant’s story. Shortly after this, defendant confirmed, by nodding her head in acknowledgement, that she was scared to hear that Franklin was a police officer when the interview started.
• We also note that both officers told defendant, on multiple occasions, that she would go home that day. They, however, did not advise her that she was free to leave during the interview, and defendant did not request to leave. In our view, this factor is neutral in determining whether a custodial interrogation took place.
• Lastly, this court also looks to the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.
• The record reflects that defendant, a woman in her late 30s, took special education classes before she dropped out of high school. Defendant failed the GED test once and never retook the exam.
• Defendant had no criminal history and no known contact with the criminal justice system. Defendant underwent a fitness evaluation prior to trial, and Dr. Stanislaus concluded that defendant had borderline intellectual functioning. In her report, Dr. Stanislaus’s indicated that defendant’s younger sister helps her with things if she cannot understand something.
• Our review of the above factors leads to the conclusion that, based upon the circumstances presented, a reasonable innocent person in defendant’s position would not have felt free to terminate her encounter and leave the fire department.
• Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation, requiring Miranda warnings.
• Because it is undisputed that no such warnings were given, the circuit court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

Here is a copy of the complaint: