Michigan Fire Department Immune from Liability in Blocking Accident

The Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled that a fire department that uses apparatus to block traffic at an accident scene, is entitled to governmental immunity in the event that an errant driver strikes the vehicle. The decision reverses a trial court ruling that held that the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity applied to potentially expose the department to liability.

The case involves a fatal accident that occurred in 2017 in the City of Ypsilanti. The facts as explained by the Court of Appeals are as follows :

• On May 29, 2017, at about 10:45 p.m., the Ypsilanti Fire Department was dispatched to the scene of a rollover accident on Interstate 94.
• Upon arrival, other emergency vehicles were already on the scene.
• Thus, the firetruck was parked partially on the roadway and partially on the shoulder so as to block other motorists traveling on the expressway from entering into the accident scene.
• The firetruck was bright yellow and had its emergency flashing lights activated.
• Shortly after arrival, the firetruck was struck in the rear by a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed which was being driven by Charles Edward Horn.
• Plaintiff’s decedent, Christina Caroline Snyder, was a backseat passenger in that vehicle and died.
• The frontseat passenger was severely injured but survived.
• Subsequently, Horn was convicted of reckless driving causing death and reckless driving causing impairment of a bodily function.
• Plaintiff filed this action against defendant, the City of Ypsilanti, alleging that its firetruck was “parked in an unsafe manner in the lane of travel, without any traffic control devices.”
• Plaintiff alleged, in part, that defendant “was guilty of ordinary negligence and misconduct” by: failing to take precautions to avoid a collision; unsafely parking or standing in the roadway; performing an unsafe “Lane Plus One maneuver”; failing to use traffic control devices; and interfering with the normal flow of traffic.

Each side retained experts who differed on whether the firefighters’ positioning of the apparats met or deviated from the standard of care. The city sought to have the case dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity. The plaintiffs wanted it to go forward on its merits to a jury trial, arguing that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity applied. The city countered that because the vehicle was parked, it was not being “operated” as required by the motor vehicle exception.

The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs, but granted a stay in the case so the city could appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding as follows:

• As a general rule, under the governmental tort liability act… a governmental agency is immune from tort liability when it is “engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”
• One statutory exception is the motor-vehicle exception. This exception provides that a governmental agency “shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner.”
• Thus, for the exception to apply, the alleged injury must have resulted directly from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
• Mere involvement of a motor vehicle is not sufficient to abrogate immunity.
• And causation under the statute must be direct as opposed to the lesser “but for” causation standard in other negligence cases.
• Here, there is no dispute that defendant is a governmental agency and that defendant owned the firetruck at issue.
• Rather, the parties’ dispute centers on whether the parked, unoccupied firetruck was being “operated,” within the contemplation of the motor-vehicle exception, at the time of the accident.
• Here, the unoccupied firetruck—which was bright yellow and had its emergency lights activated—was parked partially on the roadway and partially on the shoulder so as to block other motorists traveling on the expressway from entering into an existing accident scene when Horn struck the firetruck.
• At the time of the collision, the firetruck was not being operated “as a motor vehicle;” rather, it was being used as a roadblock or barricade.
• The firetruck’s presence on the road was no longer “directly associated with the driving” of that vehicle. In fact, it was unoccupied.
• We vacate the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition and remand for entry of an order granting the motion and dismissing plaintiff’s claims against defendant.

Here is a copy of the decision: